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ABSTRACT 
 
  Alaska’s corporate criminal liability statute exposes organizations to 
criminal liability for the actions of their agents, as long as agents intended the 
organization to benefit from their actions. Organizations cannot disclaim 
liability through codes of conduct or corporate policies, and their liability 
extends beyond any merger, consolidation, or dissolution. This Article argues 
that criminally prosecuting an organization is advantageous because it allows 
greater criminal fines and carries collateral consequences. In addition, 
criminally prosecuting an organization may be easier than criminally 
prosecuting an individual because Fifth Amendment privileges and hearsay 
obstacles do not apply. Corporations accrue the knowledge of their agents, so 
proving specific intent may also be less difficult. Finally, this Article describes 
considerations that should be weighed when deciding whether to prosecute a 
particular organization. The author argues that Alaska’s corporate criminal 
liability statute is a powerful tool that, where appropriate, should be used 
more often. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When charging cases, Alaska prosecutors too often overlook crucial 
potential defendants: the organizations1—corporations, companies, 
partnerships, and other entities—on whose behalf individual 
wrongdoers act. Alaska law casts a wide net for liability by making 
organizations liable for the criminal conduct of their agents,2 and by 
authorizing larger criminal fines against convicted organizations than 
 
 1. The term “organization” is used throughout this article because, under 
Alaska criminal law, “organization” encompasses multiple entity types. ALASKA 
STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(43) (2006). Nevertheless, much of the case law and academic 
work on this topic is couched in terms of “corporations.” For the purposes of this 
article, there is no distinction between these terms and they are used 
interchangeably. 
 2. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.130 (2006). 
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against convicted individuals.3 These considerations beg the obvious 
question: why are organizations not investigated and prosecuted more 
frequently? The most likely explanation is that few prosecutors are 
aware of how far-reaching an organization’s criminal liability extends. 
In addition, correctly or incorrectly, some prosecutors likely view the 
prosecution of an organization as an unwanted hassle—the prosecution 
would be different than their typical cases and may well involve high-
paid corporate counsel unfamiliar with criminal practice.4 Finally, some 
prosecutors might mistakenly believe that organizational prosecutions 
punish innocent shareholders rather than actual wrongdoers.5 Thus, it 
has not been common practice in state prosecutor offices to charge 
organizations.6 
The Author hopes this Article will change these views and 
encourage prosecutors to examine their caseloads for potential 
organizational defendants. There are significant benefits to be gained by 
charging organizations rather than individuals: courts will likely impose 
larger fines against organizations, prosecution of an organization may 
effect change within the organization, and negative publicity and other 
collateral consequences will pressure the organization to settle. 
Furthermore, should the case go to trial, the defense will not be able to 
protect organizations’ records or utilize certain other evidentiary tools to 
hamstring the prosecution’s presentation of evidence. 
The aftermath of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill provides a good 
illustration of why prosecuting an organization is often superior to 
prosecuting an individual wrongdoer. The 1989 grounding of the tanker 
Exxon Valdez spilled approximately eleven million gallons of crude oil 
into Prince William Sound.7 Following the grounding, the State of 
Alaska prosecuted Joseph Hazelwood, the captain of the ill-fated vessel.8 
Hazelwood was convicted by a jury of negligent discharge of oil9 but 
 
 3. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.035 (2006). 
 4. The court of appeal’s recent decision in State v. Greenpeace, Inc., 187 P.3d 
499 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008), which is discussed infra Part II.A, will do little to 
dispel such trepidation. 
 5. See Spencer R. Fisher, Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
367, 368 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 6. The author is not aware of any statistics kept by the Department of Law 
that quantify how often organizations are charged with crimes. However, the 
department is small and, anecdotally, it is evident that prosecutors bring charges 
against organizations infrequently. 
 7. State v. Hazelwood, 836 P.2d 943, 944 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 866 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1993). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. at 945.  The negligent discharge of oil is a misdemeanor.  Id. at 944. 
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received only a conditionally suspended sentence.10 Conversely, the 
United States prosecuted Exxon, ultimately resulting in a negotiated 
plea agreement and a combined criminal fine of one hundred million 
dollars.11 The latter was a better use of prosecutorial resources and 
obtained a better result.12 
It is particularly common for organizations to be defendants in 
several niche areas of Alaska criminal law. For example, Title 4 
criminalizes various aspects of alcohol-related behavior.13 Bush pilots 
who knowingly or negligently allow passengers to carry alcohol aboard 
their flights can expose their air carrier to criminal liability.14 Titles 8 and 
16 criminalize violations of the state’s hunting and fishing laws and 
regulations.15 Fishing guides who assist their clients by knowingly or 
negligently violating state fishing regulations expose their employers, 
such as lodges or guiding outfits, to criminal liability.16 
These principles also apply to the more “traditional” crimes 
defined in Title 11 of the Alaska Criminal Code. One well-publicized 
example of such a prosecution was that of Whitewater Engineering 
Corporation.17 Gary Stone, a Whitewater employee, was killed in an 
 
 10. Id. The court imposed ninety days of suspended jail time and a one 
thousand dollar suspended fine. Hazelwood was required to serve a one-year 
period of probation and complete one thousand hours of community work 
service. Id. 
 11. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Exxon to Pay Record One Billion 
Dollars in Criminal Fines and Civil Damages in Connection with Alaskan Oil 
Spill (Mar. 13, 1991) (on file with author). The U.S. Department of Justice 
prosecuted both Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Corporation. The plea 
agreements reached with these companies required Exxon Corporation to plead 
guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Exxon 
Shipping Company to plead guilty to misdemeanor violations of the Clean 
Water Act, Refuse Act, and Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Id. 
 12. The author does not mean to criticize the choices made by either state or 
federal prosecutors in the Exxon Valdez matter. The author was not a party to 
those decisions but is confident those involved thoroughly and adequately 
debated the matter. 
 13. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.11.501, 16.205 (2006) (importation of alcohol to dry 
bush communities); ALASKA STAT. § 4.16.030 (2006) (sale of alcohol to already-
intoxicated individuals); ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.16.051–.052 (2006) (sale of alcohol to 
people less than twenty-one years of age). 
 14. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.11.501, 4.16.205 (2006) (importation of alcohol to 
dry bush communities). 
 15. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 8.54.720, 16.40.290, 16.43.970 (2006). 
 16. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.40.290, 43.970 (2006). 
 17. See State v. Whitewater Eng’g Corp., No. 3AN-S00-5235CR (Alaska 
Super. Ct. indicted July 21, 2000); State v. Thom Fischer, No. 3AN-S00-6147CR 
(Alaska Super. Ct. indicted July 21, 2000). 
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avalanche at a Whitewater jobsite near Cordova.18 Prosecutors charged 
the corporation and its president, Thom A. Fischer, with manslaughter 
because key employees failed to heed avalanche warnings and failed to 
observe necessary safety precautions.19 Although charges against Fischer 
were ultimately dismissed, the company pled no contest to a charge of 
criminally negligent homicide.20 
This Article examines criminal liability of organizations under 
Alaska law. Part I begins with the historical development of 
organizational criminal liability in the United States and Alaska. Part II 
covers the current contours of organizational criminal liability, as 
codified in the Alaska Statutes and interpreted by Alaska courts. Part III 
discusses the various consequences typically flowing from a conviction. 
Additionally, Part IV explores practical considerations for prosecutors, 
and Part V explores charging considerations for prosecutors who decide 
to file charges against an organization. Within these sections and in the 
Conclusion, this Article explains why it is advantageous to prosecute 
organizations as opposed to solely prosecuting the individual 
wrongdoers. 
I.  HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
Courts were the first to recognize corporations as legal entities 
capable of suing and being sued.21 Early decisions established that 
corporations could be sued in tort. In Philadelphia, Wilmington and 
Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Quigley,22 the United States Supreme Court 
explained in detail the policy considerations that mandated this result.23 
Quigley sued the railroad for libel due to the conduct of one of its 
 
 18. Ashby Jones, Pardons Received in Whitewater (No, Not That Whitewater), 
WALL ST. J., January 26, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/01/26/pardons-
received-in-whitewater-no-not-that-whitewater. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See State v. Whitewater Eng’g Corp., No. 3AN-S00-5235CR (Alaska 
Super. Ct. entered judgment Nov. 14, 2001). The Whitewater case was in the news 
again at the end of Governor Frank Murkowski’s term in office. Governor 
Murkowski granted the corporation a pardon. See Megan Holland, Company Off 
Hook Thanks to Pardon; Family Stunned: Man was killed in an avalanche near Cordova 
in 1999, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 24, 2007, at A1. 
 21. Cf. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809); 
Louisville , Cincinnati, and Charleston R.R. Co. v. Leston, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 
(1844) (recognizing that corporations can sue and be sued but holding that the 
court would look to the citizenship of the individuals who comprise the 
corporation to determine jurisdiction); N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. 
United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909) (providing a detailed discussion of the 
development of corporate liability, including criminal liability). 
 22. 62 U.S. 202 (1958). 
 23. Id. at 210. 
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employees. The company argued that a corporation could only act 
within the limits of its charter and therefore could not be held liable for 
any acts of its agents that exceeded those limits. The Court rejected this 
argument because it would allow corporations to do business and 
interact with the public while escaping liability when corporate agents, 
conducting corporate business, injure members of the public.24 By the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, corporate tort liability was no 
longer in dispute and lawsuits against corporations were 
commonplace.25 The law imputed tortious intent from the agent to the 
corporation, making the corporation liable for actual damages. The 
courts would not, however, impute the intent necessary to award 
punitive damages for any injuries absent a showing of wrongdoing by 
the corporation itself.26 
Corporate criminal liability grew from these civil liability roots. 
Courts slowly acknowledged that corporations could be criminally 
liable for the conduct of their agents. For example, in Commonwealth v. 
Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge,27 the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
upheld the indictment of a corporation for a public nuisance.28 In 1899, 
the same court affirmed that corporations could be guilty of criminal 
contempt in Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth.29 Regarding 
corporate criminal liability, the court stated: 
 
 24. Id. at 209–10 (“There is scarcely an object of general interest for which 
some association has not been formed . . . . The powers of the corporation are 
placed in the hands of a governing body selected by members, who manage its 
affairs, and who appoint agents that exercise its faculties for the accomplishment 
of the object of its being. But these agents may infringe the rights of persons who 
are unconnected with the corporation, or who are brought into relations of 
business or intercourse with it. As a necessary correlative to the principle of the 
exercise of corporate powers and faculties by legal representatives, is the 
recognition of a corporate responsibility for the acts of those representatives.”). 
 25. See Reed v. Home Sav. Bank, 130 Mass. 443, 445 (Mass. 1881) (“The books 
of reports for a quarter of a century show that a very large proportion of actions 
of this nature, both for nonfeasance and for misfeasance, are against 
corporations.”) 
 26. See Quigley, 62 U.S. at 213–14; Lakeshore & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 
147 U.S. 101, 116–17 (1893). 
 27. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (Mass. 1854). 
 28. Id. at 353 (upholding the indictment for constructing and maintaining a 
bridge obstructing navigation on the Acushnet River). 
 29. 52 N.E. 445, 446 (Mass. 1899). The contempt arose from a newspaper 
story about an ongoing civil case. Silas Loring had sued the town of Holden 
seeking compensation for a piece of land taken by the town during a railroad 
modification project. Id. The offending story included details about how much 
the town had offered Loring before the filing of the suit and how much money 
Loring demanded. Neither fact was admissible in the ongoing trial. Id. at 447. 
When the presiding judge learned of the story, he, on his own initiative, 
instituted the contempt proceeding, issued subpoenas for the corporations to 
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We think that a corporation may be liable criminally for certain 
offenses, of which specific intent may be a necessary element. 
There is no more difficulty in imputing to a corporation specific 
intent in criminal proceedings than in civil. A corporation 
cannot be arrested and imprisoned in either civil or criminal 
proceedings; but its property may be taken, either as 
compensation for a private wrong or as punishment for a 
public wrong.30 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the general principle of 
corporate criminal liability in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 
Co. v. United States,31 in which it upheld convictions of the railroad 
corporation for paying illegal rebates.32 The Court applied the principles 
governing civil liability and held that the acts of agents are imputed to 
their employers, who may be penalized when the employees act within 
the scope of their employment.33 Without expressly mentioning the legal 
concept of respondeat superior, the Court was using it to impute 
criminal liability to the corporation from the acts of its agents. 
Numerous Ninth Circuit cases have endorsed this principle.34 
Courts in Alaska slowly recognized organizational criminal 
liability. The Alaska federal district court first addressed corporate 
criminal liability in United States v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n.35 There, the 
court considered the defendant corporation’s indictment for fishing 
violations. The corporation took the position that it could not be indicted 
for a felony because corporations cannot be imprisoned, a punishment 
for a felony.36 The court disagreed, pointing out that a corporation may 
be fined just like an individual,37 that such a penalty may be levied for 
 
appear, and held the corporations in contempt when they appeared. Id. at 445–
46. 
 30. Id. at 446. (“That a corporation may be indicted for a misfeasance as well 
as for a nonfeasance had been decided in this commonwealth.”). 
 31. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 32. Id. at 494. The corporations had paid illegal rebates to parties that had 
shipped sugar on the corporation’s railway. Id. at 489–91. 
 33. Id. at 494. 
 34. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004–07 (9th Cir. 
1972), and cases cited therein. See also United States v. Miller, 676 F.2d 359, 362 
(9th Cir. 1982) (holding knowledge and acts of company agents could be 
imputed to company and were sufficient to sustain criminal convictions against 
company); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding 
company liable for criminal acts of agent committed in scope of agent’s 
employment). 
 35. 1 Alaska 217 (D. Alaska 1901). 
 36. Id. at 219. 
 37. Id. 
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acts which would result in imprisonment for individuals,38 and that 
there was no reason a corporation should escape such punishment.39 
Essentially, the district court came to the same conclusion that the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court reached fifty years earlier in Proprietors of 
New Bedford Bridge40—criminal conduct and criminal intent can be 
imputed to an organization from its agents.41 
The Alaska legislature codified organizational criminal liability in 
1978 when it revised the state criminal code according to the 
recommendations of the Alaska Criminal Code Revision Commission.42 
The first version of section 11.16.130 of the Alaska Statutes proposed by 
the Commission was very limited.43 The Commission extended criminal 
liability only to corporations and only in instances when the alleged 
offense was a violation, a misdemeanor, or otherwise defined so as to 
clearly indicate a legislative intent to impose criminal liability on a 
corporation.44 The statute also applied to a company if the conduct was 
“engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded or knowingly 
tolerated by” the corporation’s board of directors or a “high managerial 
agent.”45 
The Commission greatly expanded the scope of the preliminary 
draft in the course of its deliberations. Significantly, the Commission 
extended criminal liability to “organizations,”46 and the definition of the 
 
 38. Id. at 222–23. 
 39. Id. at 223. 
 40. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339, 345–46 (1854) (holding that a corporation could be 
prosecuted for misfeasance and nonfeasance crimes committed by its agents if 
committed in the scope of the agent’s employment and to benefit the 
corporation). 
 41. Interestingly, a Ninth Circuit court hearing an appeal on an Alaska case 
expressed some reservations about applying the theory of respondeat superior 
to impute criminal intent to a corporation. In Empire Printing Co. v. Roden, 247 
F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1957), a case concerning libel claims brought by the former 
territorial governor, treasurer and highway engineer against a Juneau 
newspaper, the court provided dicta on point. The court of appeals stated that 
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not generally apply to impose criminal 
liability because the requisite mens rea cannot be inferred through agency 
relationships. Id. at 17. 
 42. ALASKA CRIM. CODE REV. Introduction at 11–14 (Preliminary Report 
1976).  The Commission was made up of legislators, lawyers, judges, law 
enforcement officers, and correctional agency personnel.  Id. at 11. 
 43. See id. at 115–16. The original version of the statute considered by the 
Criminal Code Revision Commission was based on OR. REV. STAT. § 161.170 
(1971) and was similar to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20 (1965) and MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.07 (1962). Id., Commentary at 1116 (Preliminary Report 1976). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. ALASKA CRIM. CODE REV., Part 2 at 27–28 (Tentative Draft 1977). The 
Commentary explains this change: “[T]he considerations which support holding 
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term was nearly identical to the current definition of the term.47 The 
Commission also changed the requirements for imposing liability under 
the first subparagraph to the disjunctive, thus imposing liability if the 
act was committed by the employee in the scope of his employment or to 
benefit the organization.48 The legislature ultimately rejected this 
construction, however, and required that the act be committed both in 
the scope of the employment and to benefit the organization. The version 
of the statute ultimately passed by the legislature mirrors the current 
version of the statute.49 
II. CURRENT CONTOURS OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY 
An organization, once constituted, has a legal identity distinct from 
its owners, officers and directors.50 It is, by statute, an artificial, legal 
“person.”51 As such, an organization may commit crimes and may be 
charged as a defendant in criminal cases.52 The criminal liability of 
organizations is defined in section 11.16.130 of the Alaska Statutes: 
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, an organization is 
legally accountable for conduct constituting an offense if the 
conduct 
(1) is the conduct of its agent, and 
(A) within the scope of the agent’s employment and in 
behalf of the organization; or 
(B) is solicited, subsequently ratified, or subsequently 
adopted by the organization; or 
(2) consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of 
affirmative performance imposed on organizations by law. 
 
corporations liable for crimes apply equally to organizations which happen to be 
unincorporated. This conclusion is embodied in the Proposed Federal Criminal 
Code § 402 and the Revised Arkansas Criminal Code § 41-402.” Id. at 37. 
 47. Id. at 36. The definition did not include “government” in the list of 
included entities; the legislature added that term in 1982. H.C.S. C.S.S.B. 535, 
12th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1982). 
 48. See id. (emphasis in original) (explaining the Commission’s intent in 
making this change was to “expand the principle of respondeat superior on an 
organization” under either scenario). 
 49. S.C.S. C.S.H.B. 661, 10th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1978). 
 50. See State v. ABC Towing, 954 P.2d 575, 577 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). 
 51. ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.060(a)(8) (2006) (“‘[P]erson’ includes a corporation, 
company, partnership, firm, association, organization, business trust, or society, 
as well as a natural person.”). 
 52. ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.130 (2006). 
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(b) In this section “agent” means a director, officer, or 
employee of an organization or any other person who is 
authorized to act in behalf of the organization. 
The Alaska Court of Appeals described the essence of this liability 
in State v. ABC Towing.53 The decision contrasts the theories of 
organizational criminal liability, set forth in section 11.16.130 of the 
Alaska Statutes, with the better known theories of accomplice criminal 
liability, set forth in section 11.16.110 of the Alaska Statutes.54 In drawing 
this comparison, the court of appeals noted organizations face broader 
criminal liability than individuals because organizations are liable for 
conduct of their agents that owners, members, officers or directors do 
not know about until after the fact.55 
The kinds of entities subject to such liability are also defined by 
statute: “‘[O]rganization’ means a legal entity, including a corporation, 
company, association, firm, partnership, joint stock company, 
foundation, institution, government, society, union, club, church, or any 
other group of persons organized for any purpose.”56 As such, 
organizations are broadly exposed to criminal liability for the acts of 
their agents. This poses an obvious problem for organizations, whose 
main purpose is to pool resources, maximize profit potential, and limit 
the liability of those individuals involved.57 At cross purposes with this 
last principle, Alaska law imposes criminal liability in cases where 
individual conduct, when appropriately construed as corporate conduct, 
runs afoul of state criminal law. 
Many critics question whether organizations should be prosecuted 
at all and argue that such prosecutions punish innocent shareholders 
rather than the actual wrongdoer. The Ninth Circuit provided a succinct 
rebuttal to that suggestion in United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp: 
Legal commentators have argued forcefully that it is 
inappropriate and ineffective to impose criminal liability upon 
 
 53. 954 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). 
 54. See id. at 576–77. 
 55. See id. 
 56. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(43) (2006). The definition does not include 
“sole proprietorship.” The court of appeals interprets this omission to mean the 
legislature did not intend to expose such entities to criminal liability in their own 
right. To the contrary, a sole proprietorship is the alter ego of the sole proprietor 
and therefore any charges must be alleged against the sole proprietor in his or 
her individual capacity. ABC Towing, 954 P.2d at 577–78. 
 57. 1 WILLIAM MEAD FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1–5 (rev. vol. 2006).  The common law fostered this 
purpose; it did not expose organizations to criminal liability. N.Y. Cent. & 
Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93 (1909). 
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a corporation, as distinguished from the human agents who 
actually perform the unlawful acts . . . particularly if the acts of 
the agents are unauthorized. . . . But it is the legislative 
judgment that controls, and “the great mass of legislation 
calling for corporate criminal liability suggests a widespread 
belief on the part of legislators that such liability is necessary to 
effectuate a regulatory policy.”58 
The crux of the argument is that organizational criminal liability 
prompts organizations to more rigorously police their agents. 
Regardless of whether this is true, the existence of corporate and, more 
generally, organizational criminal liability is beyond debate.59 
A. Alaska Jurisprudence 
Most examples of organizational criminal liability in Alaska occur 
under section 11.16.130(a)(1)(A) of the Alaska Statutes—conduct of an 
agent that is done in the scope of the agent’s employment and on behalf 
of the organization.60 
The Alaska appellate courts have discussed the substance of 
organizational criminal liability only twice.61 In State v. ABC Towing,62 
the court of appeals was called on to determine whether a towing 
company, formed as a sole proprietorship, could be prosecuted for 
violating a state pollution law, based on an employee’s illegal discharge 
of gasoline. The issue for the court was whether a sole proprietorship is 
an “organization” as defined in section 11.81.900 of the Alaska Statutes.63 
The court held that it was not, because a sole proprietorship is the mere 
alter ego of the sole proprietor.64 In other words, there is no legal 
 
 58. 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1125 (1973). The court continued: “Moreover, the strenuous efforts of 
corporate defendants to avoid conviction, particularly under the Sherman Act, 
strongly suggests that Congress is justified in its judgment that exposure of the 
corporate entity to potential conviction may provide a substantial spur to 
corporate action to prevent violations by employees.” Id. 
 59. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 
1963) (“It is now beyond doubt that a corporation may be held criminally 
liable.”). 
 60. That this is the most typical mode of organizational criminal liability is 
not surprising. Most organizations, do not typically solicit, ratify, adopt criminal 
conduct, or fail to do something required by law. ALASKA STAT. § 
11.16.130(a)(1)(B)–(a)(2) (2006). 
 61. It was briefly commented on in a third case, Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3 
(Alaska 1974). 
 62. 954 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). 
 63. Id. at 579. 
 64. Id. at 577–78. 
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distinction between the sole proprietor and the proprietorship; to 
prosecute the proprietorship, the state must charge the proprietor.65 
The court of appeals provided more recent guidance in State v. 
Greenpeace, Inc.66 The State prosecuted and convicted Greenpeace, Inc. 
for bringing a Greenpeace ship, the M/V Arctic Sunrise, into state waters 
without a state-approved oil spill contingency plan or a certificate of 
financial responsibility.67 Following the jury’s guilty verdicts against the 
corporation, the district court granted a defense motion for acquittal and 
set the convictions aside.68 The court of appeals affirmed the district 
court based on findings that Greenpeace, Inc., a United States 
corporation, was not in charge of the ship and did not control its 
operators.69 According to the court, the prosecution charged the wrong 
parties.70 The case involved Stichting Phoenix,71 a Dutch foundation that 
owned the Arctic Sunrise, and Stichting Marine Services (SMS), a second 
Dutch foundation that operated it.72 SMS chartered the ship to 
Greenpeace International, a third Dutch entity, that owns the name 
“Greenpeace.”73 Greenpeace International licenses this name to 
independent environmental organizations around the world including 
Greenpeace, Inc. in the United States.74 In 2004, Greenpeace 
International agreed to let Greenpeace, Inc. use the Arctic Sunrise for an 
anti-logging campaign.75 SMS supplied the crew and was also 
responsible for making sure the ship complied with all local regulatory 
requirements.76 The prosecution argued that SMS and the Arctic Sunrise 
 
 65. Further discussion regarding this holding is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, the author takes issue with the court’s reasoning because it 
needlessly insulates sole proprietorships from criminal liability where one of its 
agents commits a wrong in furtherance of a business enterprise. The legislature 
should fix this omission by amending the “organization” definition to 
specifically include sole proprietorships. See supra note 60 and accompanying 
text. 
 66. 187 P.3d 499 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). 
 67. Id. at 500. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 503–11. The district court also granted a motion for acquittal 
propounded by the captain of the Arctic Sunrise who had also been convicted. Id. 
The court of appeals affirmed as to the first count but reversed as to the second. 
Id. 
 70. Id. at 505. 
 71. “Stichting” is the Dutch word for “foundation.” Id. at 500. 
 72. Id. at 501. 
 73. Id. at 504. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 505. 
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captain were agents of Greenpeace, Inc. and, therefore, Greenpeace, Inc. 
was liable for the criminal conduct.77 The court of appeals disagreed: 
A person or organization does not qualify as the authorized 
agent of a principal unless the principal controls or has the 
right to control the purported agent. The State offered no 
evidence that Greenpeace, Inc., controlled how (or if) SMS or 
[the captain] operated the Arctic Sunrise or complied with 
Alaska’s requirements for nontank vessels.78 
The prosecution also argued that Greenpeace, Inc. ratified or 
adopted the criminal conduct of SMS and the Arctic Sunrise and was 
therefore liable for their conduct.79 Again, the court of appeals 
disagreed. The court held that adoption or ratification requires the 
principal’s “awareness of the misconduct and some action to ratify or 
adopt the misconduct.”80 It found that the prosecution had not produced 
any evidence Greenpeace, Inc. knew of the illegal conduct or took any 
actions to ratify or adopt that conduct.81 
Though the court does not explicitly say, its decision suggests that 
SMS, or arguably Greenpeace International, was the proper defendant.82 
This holding nevertheless begs the question of whether Alaska could 
effectively prosecute either of these foreign entities in state court. Service 
of process on these entities would be problematic,83 and even if service 
were achieved, the entities would likely argue that the Alaska state 
 
 77. See id. at 504. The State further argued that Greenpeace, Inc., Greenpeace 
International, and SMS were all the same organization but were constructed as 
separate entities as part of a “shell game” to avoid liability. The court disagreed 
with this argument as well. Id. 
 78. Id. at 505. 
 79. See id. at 505–06; see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.130(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 80. Id. at 506. 
 81. Id. This was a somewhat curious conclusion considering the fact that 
Greenpeace, Inc.’s chief financial officer was on board the Arctic Sunrise at the 
time of the infractions. 
 82. See id. (“It was SMS, not Greenpeace, Inc., that hired and paid for the 
ship’s agent in Portland. . . . [I]t was SMS’s obligation to comply with regulatory 
requirements for the vessel.”). 
 83. See ALASKA CRIM. R. 4(c)(2) (making service difficult by limiting the 
service of a summons to places “within the jurisdiction of the State of Alaska”); 
see also ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.763 (2006) (service on foreign corporations); ALASKA 
STAT. § 10.20.046 (2006) (service on not-for-profit corporations); ALASKA STAT. 
§10.40.130 (2006) (service on religious corporations); and ALASKA STAT. § 
10.50.065  (2006) (service on limited liability companies). But see ALASKA STAT. §§ 
10.06.175(b), 06.765 (2006) (allowing the Alaska Commissioner of Commerce, 
Community and Economic Development to be served if a corporation fails to 
appoint or maintain a registered agent in the state). 
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courts lack personal jurisdiction over them.84 Finally, it is difficult to 
imagine how the state could effectively enforce any sentence ultimately 
imposed by its courts. 
Collectively, ABC Towing and Greenpeace, Inc. confirm the existence 
of organizational criminal liability under state law. These decisions do 
little, however, to define the contours and limitations of that liability 
and, in fact, highlight problems with the existing laws. ABC Towing 
carves out an exemption for sole proprietorships.85 Greenpeace is also 
problematic in that it illustrates the ease with which organizations might 
compartmentalize their operations or duplicate themselves and thereby 
thwart criminal prosecution.86 These are shortcomings legislators need 
to address if the prosecution of organizations is to be effectively and 
consistently utilized. 
Given the paucity of pertinent Alaska jurisprudence regarding 
organizational criminal liability, Alaska courts would likely rely on 
relevant federal authority.87 Federal cases frequently acknowledge that a 
 
 84. In fact, Alaska’s jurisdiction is quite broad. Under section 44.03.010 of the 
Alaska Statutes, state territorial jurisdiction extends to waters offshore and 
encompasses the “high seas” to the extent the United States exercises its 
jurisdiction. The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted this provision broadly to 
include all ocean waters seaward of the Alaska coast. See State v. Jack, 125 P.3d 
311, 315–16 (Alaska 2005) (allowing defendant to be prosecuted in Alaska for 
sexual assault that took place onboard an Alaska Marine Highway ferry while in 
Canadian waters during a voyage between Alaska and Washington). Arguably, 
both entities would have sufficient contacts with the State of Alaska, based on 
the sailing and operation of the Arctic Sunrise in Alaska waters, to make them 
subject to the personal jurisdiction of a state court. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 
326 U.S. 310, 317–19 (1945) (holding contacts exist when the in-state activities of 
the corporation give rise to the liabilities at issue, or the corporation fails to 
satisfy obligations that exist due to its in-state activities); Kuk v. Nalley, 166 P.3d 
47, 51 (Alaska 2007) (explaining that International Shoe and its progeny 
significantly broadened the understanding of personal jurisdiction). 
 85. See 954 P.2d 575, 577–79 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). The ABC Towing 
decision is unsatisfying. Id. The court of appeals favorably compared sole 
proprietorships and partnerships—both are the alter egos of the proprietor or 
partners, both exist solely to carry out the business purpose for which they were 
created, and both are not common law “legal entities.” Id. Nevertheless, the 
court interprets the definition of “organization” in a way that treats the two 
entities differently, i.e., partnerships can be prosecuted, sole proprietorships 
cannot. Id. The ruling is defensible from a statutory construction standpoint, but 
it is unsatisfactory from a public policy standpoint. The same policy arguments 
that support the prosecution of partnerships for criminal offenses apply to sole 
proprietorships. See id. There is no reason these entities should be treated 
differently. 
 86. See supra notes 63–81 and accompanying text. 
 87. See State v. Lee, 999 P.2d 755, 761 (Alaska 2000) (noting Alaska courts use 
federal Sherman Act cases to construe Alaska antitrust law); State v. Abbott, 498 
P.2d 712, 717 (Alaska 1972) (holding where no Alaska cases are on point, court 
may rely on federal cases that discuss a similarly worded federal statute); 
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corporation can act only through its officers, agents, and employees.88 
Courts therefore hold that a corporation may be liable for the acts of its 
officers, employees, and other agents even though the questioned act 
may be illegal, contrary to specific company policy, or not expressly 
authorized beforehand by the corporation.89 
B. Existence of Organization Policies Prohibiting the Criminal 
Conduct and the Requisite Quantum of Benefit 
Federal cases hold that an organization may be found guilty of a 
criminal offense as long as the employee was motivated, at least in part, 
to benefit the organization.90 It follows that organizations often attempt 
to absolve themselves of liability by relying on corporate policies that 
preclude criminal conduct. These attempts have generally been 
unsuccessful. The Ninth Circuit addressed such an effort in the context 
of Sherman Act prosecutions.91 In Hilton Hotels Corp.,92 charges were 
premised on proof that the hotel’s purchasing agent threatened a 
supplier with the loss of the hotel’s business unless the supplier paid an 
assessment to a trade association of which the hotel was a member.93 
Hotel personnel testified that company policy required purchasing 
 
Langfeldt-Haaland v. Saupe Enter., Inc., 768 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Alaska 1989) 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (noting Alaska courts rely on interpretations of federal 
rules when interpreting a similarly worded Alaska rule). 
 88. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988) (citing Bellis v. 
United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974)). 
 89. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998); see also N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. v. United 
States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (“[A] corporation is held responsible for acts not 
within the agent's corporate powers strictly construed, but which the agent has 
assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers 
actually authorized, and in such cases there need be no written authority under 
seal or vote of the corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize 
the act.”). 
 90. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 892–93 
(D.D.C. 2006) (“[I]f a corporate agent exercises the authority conferred upon him 
and performs an act within the course of his employment, the corporation is 
liable—even if the act was unlawful or was done contrary to instructions or 
policies, as long as the agent acted with an intent to benefit the corporation.”); 
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241–42 (1st Cir. 1982) ("[C]riminal 
liability may be imposed on the corporation only where the agent is acting 
within the scope of his employment. That, in turn, requires that the agent be 
performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform, and those acts 
must be motivated—at least in part—by an intent to benefit the corporation."). 
 91. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972); see also 
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809); Louisville, Cincinnati & 
Charleston R.R. Co. v. Leston, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). 
 92. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 93. Id. at 1002. 
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supplies solely on the basis of price, quality, and service, and they had 
specifically instructed the purchasing agent not to boycott suppliers.94 
The Ninth Circuit held that the hotel could not insulate itself from 
criminal liability by adopting general instructions not to participate in a 
boycott if it did not take sufficient actions to enforce those instructions.95 
The fact remained that the hotel authorized a purchasing agent to act on 
its behalf and the agent exercised complete authority as to those 
responsibilities and, pursuant to that authority, added the hotel’s buying 
power to the force of the boycott. 96 Other circuits have taken a similar 
position when employees act contrary to company policy.97 
An important corollary is that courts generally permit defendants 
to admit evidence of corporate policies or instructions that forbid the 
conduct at issue to support an argument that an agent was acting 
outside the scope of employment or to the principal’s detriment. The 
Ninth Circuit summarized this view: 
[A] corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done 
contrary to express instructions and policies, but that the 
 
 94. Id. at 1005. 
 95. Id. at 1007 (affirming trial court’s ruling excluding a jury instruction that 
precluded criminal liability where the employee’s acts were unauthorized by the 
corporation). 
 96. Id. (“The purchasing agent was authorized to buy all of appellant’s 
supplies. Purchases were made on the basis of specifications, but the purchasing 
agent exercised complete authority as to the source. He was in a unique position 
to add the corporation’s buying power to the force of the boycott. Appellant 
could not gain exculpation by issuing general instructions without undertaking 
to enforce those instructions by means commensurate with the obvious risks.”). 
 97. In United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2006), the First Circuit 
squarely rejected an argument that a corporation might fend off liability by 
adopting abstract rules that no agent can make an unlawful price-fixing contract 
or that no driver may exceed the speed limit. Id. at 25–26 (citing United States v. 
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406 & n. 5 (4th Cir. 1985)). Thus, a 
corporation may be charged and convicted, even if there is a specific company 
directive forbidding the questioned acts. The court explained that this is simply 
an extension of familiar agency law principles: the principal is held liable for acts 
done on its account by an agent which are customarily actions the agent is 
authorized to perform. Potter, 463 F.3d at 26 (citing H. Reuschlein & Gregory, 
THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 167 (1990) (footnote omitted)). 
  The Fourth Circuit adopted very similar reasoning in United States v. 
Basic Constr. Co., wherein it rejected a corporation’s attempt to insulate itself 
from liability using evidence that the corporation had expressly forbidden the 
conduct at issue. 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). 
  The Restatement (Second) of Agency explains the general rule these 
decisions expound by way of an illustration: P directs the salesman in selling 
guns, never to insert a cartridge while exhibiting a gun. A, a salesman, does so, 
and negligently harms a bystander. Notwithstanding P’s instructions otherwise, 
the salesman’s act is within the scope of employment. Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 230, illus. 1 (1958) (forbidden acts). 
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existence of such instructions and policies may be considered 
in determining whether the employee in fact acted to benefit 
the corporation. Merely stating or publishing such instructions 
and policies without diligently enforcing them is not enough to 
place the acts of an employee who violates them outside the 
scope of his employment. It is a question of fact whether 
measures taken to enforce corporate policy in this area will 
adequately insulate the corporation against such acts . . . 98 
Other courts have reached similar rulings.99 
It is not necessary that the organization actually accrue a benefit 
from the agent’s actions for criminal liability to attach. In Beusch,100 the 
Ninth Circuit rejected a corporation’s argument that it could not be 
liable if the criminal conduct did not in fact benefit the corporation.101 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Automated Medical 
Laboratories, Inc.102 is frequently cited on this point—the court affirmed a 
jury’s conviction of American Medical Laboratories for falsifying 
logbooks and records required to be maintained by the Federal Drug 
Administration.103 In Automated Medical Laboratories, the court held that 
benefit was an evidential fact, stating: 
[W]hether the agent’s actions ultimately redounded to the 
benefit of the corporation is less significant than whether the 
agent acted with the intent to benefit the corporation. The basic 
purpose of requiring that an agent have acted with the intent to 
benefit the corporation, however, is to insulate the corporation 
from criminal liability for actions of its agents which be inimical 
to the interests of the corporation or which may have been 
undertaken solely to advance the interests of that agent or of a 
party other than the corporation.104 
 
 98. United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 99. See, e.g., Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d at 572–73 (allowing a jury to consider a 
company’s antitrust compliance policy in the prosecution of the company for 
Sherman Act antitrust violations by its employees who rigged bidding on state 
road paving contracts); Potter, 463 F.3d at 26 (allowing a jury to consider a 
company president’s specific instructions to a subordinate not to make illegal 
payments in considering fraud charges against company who bribed a state 
representative). 
 100. 596 F.2d at 877. 
 101. Id.; see also Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1428–29 (9th Cir. 
1989) (having purpose to benefit the principal is required, rather than actual 
benefit, if agent’s actions are to be imputed to the principal). 
 102. 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 103. Id. at 407–08. 
 104. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted). 
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These cases collectively illustrate that whether the agent’s conduct 
benefits the organization is a question of fact for the jury. The cases also 
demonstrate that appellate courts will let convictions stand so long as 
there is some evidence that the organization gained some benefit. In 
comparison, criminal conduct by an agent falling outside the scope of 
employment will not be imputed to the organization where the conduct 
solely benefits the agent. Such was the case in Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. 
United States,105 in which the Fifth Circuit reversed convictions against 
two corporate defendants because the criminal acts by the employees, 
while benefiting themselves, actually injured the corporation.106 
Alaska cases contemplating the application of respondeat superior 
liability in the context of tort claims have echoed the holding of Standard 
Oil. Notable among these are Taranto v. North Slope Borough,107 Northern 
Fabrication Co., Inc. v. Arco, Inc.,108 and Ondrusek v. Murphy.109 All three 
cases apply the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 228 criteria to 
determine whether an agent acted in the scope of his employment. 
Pursuant to section 228, conduct is only in the scope of employment if—
among other requirements—it is done at least in part to serve the 
employer. Thus, in Northern Fabrication Co., Inc., the Alaska Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant corporations and held that the corporations could only 
negate the plaintiff’s claim of vicarious liability for the theft of 
equipment by the defendants’ employees if the corporations could prove 
they did not control the employees’ actions and the employees acted 
solely in furtherance of their own personal motives.110 
These cases demonstrate that an organization cannot insulate itself 
from liability with general policies or guidance that forbid the conduct 
at issue. However, an organization can use policies or guidance in an 
effort to convince a jury that the organization took sufficient action to 
prevent the wrongful conduct and should not be liable for the actions of 
an agent. Moreover, the organization will not be liable for conduct that 
an agent takes solely for his or her own benefit, or that is inimical to the 
organization’s interests. 
 
 105. 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 106. Id. at 129. The employees falsified documents related to shipments of oil 
through a pipeline. The employees personally profited by this deceit, but their 
employer, the owner of the oil, lost money. Id. 
 107. 909 P.2d 354 (Alaska 1996). 
 108. No. S-8368, 1999 WL 33958767 (Alaska Jan. 27, 1999). 
 109. 120 P.3d 1053 (Alaska 2005). 
 110. 1999 WL 33958767, at *2 (citing Los Ranchitos v. Tierra Grande, Inc., 861 
P.2d 263 (N.M. App. 1993)). 
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C. Collective Corporate Knowledge 
For a time, specific intent crimes that require proof of knowing or 
intentional conduct were difficult to apply against large or diverse 
organizations. Organizations tend to compartmentalize their operations 
and decision-making between different units or divisions. Therefore the 
requisite mens rea or conduct is often not present in any one individual, 
making imputing mens rea to the organization difficult. Many courts 
have resolved this problem through the collective corporate knowledge 
theory best described by the First Circuit in United States v. Bank of New 
England.111 
The acts of a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of 
its employees operating within the scope of their employment. 
The law on corporate criminal liability reflects this. . . . 
Similarly, the knowledge obtained by corporate employees 
acting within the scope of their employment is imputed to the 
corporation. Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, 
subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into 
smaller components. The aggregate of those components 
constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular 
operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one 
component of an operation know the specific activities of 
employees administering another aspect of the operation . . .112 
This line of reasoning enables prosecutors to impute the summed 
knowledge of various employees to the organization as a whole.113 
 
 111. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 112. Id. at 856 (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. T.I.M.E.-
D.C., Inc., 381 F.Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. W. Va. 1974) (“[A] corporation cannot 
plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several employees 
was not acquired by any one individual who then would have comprehended its 
full import. Rather the corporation is considered to have acquired the collective 
knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act 
accordingly.”)). 
 113. See Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir. 1958); Inland 
Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1951); Camacho v. 
Bowling, 562 F. Supp. 1012, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 1983); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., 
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738–39 (W.D. W. Va. 1974); United States v. Sawyer 
Transp., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1972); 
People v. Am. Med. Ctrs. of Mich., Ltd., 324 N.W.2d 782, 793 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 535 (N.H. 1997). The author is 
unaware of any similar Alaska or Ninth Circuit cases. 
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D. Effect of Merger, Consolidation, and Dissolution 
Any liability imputed to an organization will generally survive the 
organization’s merger, consolidation, or dissolution. The common law 
analogized the dissolution of an organization (either directly, or by 
merger or consolidation) to the death of a natural person,114 meaning 
that dissolved, merged, or consolidated organizations could not be 
prosecuted.115 
State statutes that continue the legal existence of these entities have 
eroded this common law principle. It is now generally true that 
organizations can be prosecuted (or sued civilly) following their 
dissolution, merger or consolidation. In Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United 
States,116 the United States Supreme Court discussed this abrogation of 
the common law. Prosecutors indicted three related corporations for 
violations of the Sherman Act.117 While the indictments were pending, 
the corporations dissolved and became new divisions in a single, 
separate corporation.118 The district court and court of appeals held that 
the dissolution of the original corporations did not abate the 
indictments.119 The Supreme Court affirmed, looking to both Maryland 
and Delaware law and finding that the states had statutes “saving” 
claims against dissolved corporations.120 The Court interpreted these 
statutes to include criminal charges under the Sherman Act.121 Other 
courts have come to the same conclusion respecting corporations and 
partnerships organized under the laws of other states.122 
 
 114. H. Lowell Brown, Successor Corporate Criminal Liability: The Emerging 
Federal Common Law, 49 ARK. L. REV. 469, 471 (1996) (citing Okla. Natural Gas Co. 
v. Okla., 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. 359 U.S. 271 (1959). 
 117. Id. at 271. 
 118. Id. at 272–73. 
 119. Id. at 272. 
 120. See id. at 272–74. The applicable Maryland statute provided that 
dissolution did not “‘abate any pending suit or proceeding by or against the 
corporation.’” Id. at 273 (citing Flack’s MD. CODE ANN., art. 23, § 78(a) (1951)). 
The applicable Delaware statute provided that “any ‘proceeding’ begun by or 
against a corporation before or within three years after dissolution shall continue 
‘until any judgments, orders, or decrees therein shall be fully executed.’” Id. 
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1953)). 
 121. Id. at 273–74. 
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 776 F.2d 1476, 1479–80 
(10th Cir. 1985) (holding Sherman Act and mail fraud prosecutions of Oklahoma 
corporation and partnership, both of which dissolved prior to their indictments, 
did not abate under Oklahoma statutory law); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 
856, 906–09 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., concurring) (noting that criminal 
charges against surviving corporation of a merger, formed when a former New 
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There is no analogous holding in Alaska case law. The closest case 
on point, Gossman v. Greatland Directional Drilling, Inc.,123 discusses the 
viability of civil claims brought against a dissolved corporation for 
negligent conduct during the corporation’s existence.124 Greatland 
dissolved in 1993 following the purchase of its assets by Anadrill, a 
distinct corporation.125 In 1995, plaintiff Gossman was injured while 
working for Anadrill at one of the facilities Anadrill purchased from 
Greatland.126 The injury was caused by a piece of equipment that had 
been negligently modified by a Greatland employee years before the 
corporation’s dissolution.127 In 1996, Gossman filed negligence claims 
against Greatland.128 The Alaska Supreme Court looked to section 
10.06.678 of the Alaska Statutes—a survival statute for claims against 
corporations—to determine whether any provision abrogated the 
common law abatement theory.129 At the time (and currently), section 
10.06.678, in pertinent part, provided: 
(a) A corporation that is dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily 
continues to exist for the purpose of winding up its affairs, 
defending actions against it, and enabling it to collect and 
discharge obligations, dispose of and convey its property, and 
collect and divide its assets. A dissolved corporation does not 
continue to exist for the purpose of continuing business except 
so far as necessary for winding up the business. 
(b) An action or proceeding to which a corporation is a party 
does not abate by the dissolution of the corporation or by 
reason of proceedings for winding up and dissolution of the 
 
York company merged into its New York parent corporation, that arose from the 
criminal conduct of the former subsidiary, did not abate under New York 
corporation law which contains a saving statute preserving claims against 
merged or consolidated corporations); United States v. San Diego Grocers Ass’n, 
Inc., 177 F. Supp. 352, 354–55 (C.D. Cal. 1959) (holding that Sherman Act 
prosecution against California corporations that dissolved before indictments 
were filed did not abate under California Code where Code contains section 
extending life of dissolved corporations for the purpose of defending actions 
against it); Commonwealth v. Lavelle, 555 A.2d 218, 230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
(holding that state corruption prosecution against successor corporation did not 
abate under Pennsylvania law where there was a de facto merger or fraudulent 
transaction). 
 123. 973 P.2d 93 (Alaska 1999). 
 124. Id. at 94–95. 
 125. Id. at 94. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 95 n.4. (citing Hood Bros. Partners, L.P. v. USCO Distrib. Servs. 
Inc., 140 F.3d 1386, 1387–88 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that a survival statute 
extended the life of a corporation for litigation purposes)). 
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corporation. A corporation that is dissolved voluntarily or 
involuntarily may not commence a court action, except for a 
court action under [section] 10.06.675.130 
The court reviewed the legislative history of section 10.06.678 and 
examined treatment of similar statutes in other jurisdictions before 
deciding claims do not abate against a dissolved corporation.131 
Gossman does not address criminal prosecutions. However, the 
court’s analysis in this civil case mirrors the analysis the Supreme Court 
used in Melrose Distillers in a criminal context.132 There is no reason to 
believe an Alaska court would analyze the issue any differently in the 
context of a criminal case. Moreover, Alaska courts routinely rely on 
federal authorities when interpreting Alaska law that has no case 
precedent and is similar to federal laws.133 A number of jurisdictions 
have adopted Melrose Distillers,134 and Alaska courts have cited Melrose 
Distillers for other propositions.135 
Further, as is discussed above, the Alaska Supreme Court in 
Gossman interpreted section 10.06.678 of the Alaska Statutes liberally to 
include claims that accrued after the dissolution of the corporation.136 
This suggests that the court would likewise liberally interpret the statute 
if faced with the question of whether the statute is inclusive of criminal 
charges. In short, dissolution, merger, and consolidation of a corporation 
should not foreclose the State’s ability to prosecute the corporation, 
although it might make it more difficult to collect fines that are 
ultimately imposed.137 
 
 130. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.678(a)–(b) (2006). 
 131. Gossman, 973 P.2d at 95–99. If Gossman were to obtain a judgment 
against Greatland, he could seek to recover the damages from Anadrill because 
Anadrill purchased all of Greatland’s liabilities. Id. at 99. 
 132. 359 U.S. 271 (1959). 
 133. See Odom v. Lee, 999 P.2d 755, 761 (Alaska 2000) (Alaska courts use 
federal Sherman Act cases to construe Alaska antitrust law); see also State v. 
Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 717 (Alaska 1972) (where no Alaska cases on point, court 
may rely on federal cases discussing similarly worded federal statute). 
 134. See United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 908 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J. 
concurring); People v. Boyce, 509 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1987); People 
v. Pymm Thermometer Corp., 591 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
 135. See Univ. of Alaska v. Thomas Architectural Products, Inc., 907 P.2d 448, 
450 (Alaska 1995) (recognizing that Washington survival statutes supplant the 
common law rule of abatement and prolong the life of a corporation so that it 
can be sued); Hartwell v. State, 423 P.2d 282, 283 (Alaska 1967). 
 136. Gossman, 973 P.2d 95–99. 
 137. See id. Under Alaska law, corporations, prior to dissolution, must 
provide for their outstanding liabilities by purchasing liability insurance, setting 
aside assets, or having a successor assume its liabilities. Id. at 99 (citing §§ 
ALASKA STAT. 10.06.620(2), 06.668(1)). Anadrill had assumed all of Greatland’s 
liabilities and this would include any judgment plaintiff Gossman obtained from 
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Alaska has similar survival statutes that are applicable to other 
organizations. However, some of the survival statutes—such as those 
that apply to non-profit corporations138 or limited liability 
companies139—carry time limitations which may affect potential claims 
or charges. 
III. PROSECUTORIAL CONSEQUENCES 
A. Penalty Provisions 
Organizations are not subject to the same penalties as individual 
defendants. While organizations can only act through their agents, 
organizations cannot be punished in the same way as their agents.140 
Special penalty provisions exist for organizations based on the 
severity of the underlying crime.141 In assessing a fine under these 
provisions the sentencing court considers: 
(1) measures taken by the organization to discipline an officer, 
director, employee, or agent of the organization; 
(2) measures taken by the organization to prevent a recurrence 
of the offense; 
(3) the organization’s obligation to make restitution to a victim 
of the offense, and the extent to which imposition of a fine will 
impair the ability of the organization to make restitution; and 
(4) the extent to which the organization will pass on to 
consumers the expense of the fine.142 
 
his lawsuit. Id. The State would face a similar situation if it successfully 
prosecuted a dissolved corporation. Depending on how the corporation 
provided for its post-dissolution liabilities, the State may try to collect the 
penalties imposed against an insurance policy, against a successor corporation, 
or against a finite pool of assets set aside prior to the corporation’s dissolution. 
In that final scenario, the assets might be insufficient, particularly if the 
corporation left numerous creditors, and the State could get stuck with a 
judgment it cannot collect (or not easily collect without some veil-piercing 
litigation). 
 138. ALASKA STAT. § 10.20.450 (2006). 
 139. ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.440 (2006). 
 140. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959) (holding 
that corporations cannot be sent to jail, they can only be fined). 
 141. Under section 12.55.035(c)(1) of the Alaska Statutes, an organization can 
be fined up to a million dollars for felony offenses or misdemeanor offenses that 
result in death, up to two hundred thousand dollars for Class A misdemeanor 
offenses, up to twenty five thousand dollars for Class B misdemeanor offenses, 
and up to ten thousand dollars for violations. Alternatively, greater fines can be 
imposed under sections 12.55.035(c)(2) or (3) of the Alaska Statutes, which allow 
for fines up to three times the pecuniary gain realized, or three times the 
damages caused by the offense. 
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These considerations are in addition to statutory and common law 
factors Alaska courts consider in deciding any criminal sentence.143 
Generally, it is not difficult to frame these factors in a way to justify 
substantial fines under any of the penalty matrices available for use 
against organizations. If the organization is large, a substantial fine 
would be justified so that it has an appreciable penalty or deterrent 
impact on the organization’s operations. The fine would likewise need 
to be large to cause other similarly situated organizations to take notice 
and action to ensure they do not commit similar errors. 
Consider two examples. First, if a fishing lodge allows its clients to 
commit hunting and fishing violations to ensure they catch a lot of fish 
and have a good time, a small fine would not act as a sufficient 
deterrent. Because these lodges often have significant revenues, fines at 
the top of the penalty range set forth in section 12.55.035(c) of the Alaska 
Statutes would be necessary and justified. These are common sense 
arguments that are likely to have traction with the sentencing court. 
Second, imagine a service station operating as an LLC that knowingly 
functions with leaking underground fuel tanks. The situation comes to 
light when diesel range organics are discovered in a nearby creek. 
Investigation traces the fuel back to the service station and additional 
investigation produces evidence that the manager had been aware of the 
leak for several months. The Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation (DEC) hires a private environmental services firm to 
design and implement a clean-up and remediation plan for the polluted 
land and water and to monitor the water quality of the creek for five 
years. The total cost for these services exceeds a million dollars. Under 
section 12.55.035(c)(3) of the Alaska Statutes, the potential fine against 
the LLC could exceed three million dollars. This fine could be in 
addition to the restitution owed to the state for the cost of the clean-up 
and remediation work itself. Admittedly, the sentencing court, in 
imposing the fine, would have to consider how section 12.55.035(e)(3) of 
the Alaska Statutes would affect the company’s ability to pay restitution 
to the DEC. However, if the company is large enough, it is easy to 
picture the court imposing the full fine. Penalties of this magnitude can 
 
 142. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.035(e) (2006). 
 143. The court considers a defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation, the need 
to confine or isolate the defendant to prevent further public harm, the extent to 
which the sentence to be imposed will deter the defendant as well as other 
members of the community from future criminal conduct, and the extent to 
which the sentence will reaffirm societal norms or the community’s 
condemnation of the conduct. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005; State v. Chaney, 477 
P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1970). 
1 - CHEYETTE__FINAL2.DOC 12/11/2008  2:39:04 PM 
2008 POLICING THE CORPORATE CITIZEN 199 
provide a strong incentive for organizations to resolve potential criminal 
liability quickly.144 
Because criminal conduct exposes the organization to potentially 
substantial criminal penalties and negative publicity, an organization 
will often terminate or discipline the responsible employees, cooperate 
with investigating agencies, and may hire consultants for the design of 
new protocols to avoid similar mistakes in the future. These are all 
constructive steps moving forward from the misconduct and are factors 
a sentencing court is to consider in assessing a fine against an 
organization pursuant to section 12.55.035(e) of the Alaska Statutes. 
B. Collateral Consequences 
Collateral consequences triggered by a conviction will also be a 
powerful force shaping the course of many prosecutions. Organizations 
are generally required to report all pending liabilities in their annual 
financial statements. This typically includes pending criminal cases as 
well as any completed cases for which the organization is on 
probation.145 Disclosure of a pending criminal case or conviction can be 
damaging to an organization’s public image or reputation. The publicity 
from prosecution would likely tarnish the image of a company and 
undo any marketing efforts that the company previously undertook. 
Further, the prosecution would likely damage the company’s image 
amongst stockholders, creditors and Wall Street analysts, causing 
significant financial repercussions. 
Debarment is another significant collateral consequence. Both 
federal and state law allows the respective sovereigns to refuse to do 
business with organizations that have been convicted of or otherwise 
suspected of crimes or dishonest business practices.146 At the federal 
level, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is particularly 
vigilant in debarring organizations that are convicted or suspected of 
 
 144. Defense attorneys commonly argue that the State should not seek the full 
measure of fines authorized by section 12.35.055 of Alaska Statutes because 
doing so would preclude the organization from devoting resources to correct the 
problem that led to the violation, or to pay restitution. This is a fair argument in 
many instances. 
 145. Probation is imposed by the sentencing court and can be up to ten years. 
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090(c) (2006). 
 146. In response to Congressional oversight hearings regarding the 
mismanagement of federal contracts, the Office of Management and Budget 
developed a government-wide debarment and suspension system in the early 
1980s. See Brief History of EPA’s Debarment Program, http://www.epa.gov/ 
ogdunix1/sdd/history.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2008). 
1 - CHEYETTE__FINAL2.DOC 12/11/2008  2:39:04 PM 
200 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 25:2 
environmental crimes.147 Debarment is damaging because a large 
percentage of Alaska companies are the recipients of federal or state 
contracts.148 The loss of these contracts can be financially crippling to 
companies. The State of Alaska also has legislative authority to debar 
companies but, unfortunately, rarely uses that power.149 
By way of an example, consider a small bush air service that 
transports mail year round and a steady number of government 
biologists as passengers during the summer. If the company knowingly 
allows passengers to transport alcohol to local option dry 
communities150 on its flights, it could be prosecuted for violations of 
Alaska’s alcohol importation laws.151 A conviction could potentially 
trigger federal or state debarment and thereby jeopardize the air 
service’s ability to retain the mail or biologist travel contracts. This could 
constitute another financial blow to the company in addition to the fines 
or consequences that flow from the prosecution.152 
 
 147. The EPA is statutorily required to debar companies convicted of 
violations of section 508 of the Clean Water Act or section 306 of the Clean Air 
Act. The EPA also has the discretionary authority to suspend or debar 
companies based on indictments, information or adequate evidence involving 
environmental crimes, contract fraud, embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, 
poor performance, non-performance, or false statements. See Suspension and 
Debarment Program, http://www.epa.gov/ogdunix1/sdd/debarment.htm 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008.) Other executive branch agencies also have the 
authority to suspend and debar. 
 148.  Based on the Author’s anecdotal observations that the federal 
government is very active in Alaska and therefore contracts with many Alaskan 
companies for services and products. 
 149. While the state has legislative authority to debar entities, it rarely does 
so. State debarment is controlled by sections 36.30.635–36.30.685 of the Alaska 
Statutes. The grounds for debarment are set out in section 36.30.640 of the 
Alaska Statutes and include a broad range of unethical or fraudulent conduct. 
Nevertheless, these consequences are rarely, if ever, invoked. In response to an 
inquiry to the Alaska Department of Law, the Department told the Author of 
only one state suspension or debarment matter. In the Author’s view, the State, 
by failing to more proactively utilize its debarment authority, forgoes a powerful 
deterrence tool. 
 150. Communities can elect to ban the sale or possession of alcohol. ALASKA 
STAT. § 4.11.491 (2006). 
 151. The Alaska Statutes criminalize such conduct. ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.11.499, 
16.200(e) (2006). 
 152. Significantly, the plane used to illegally transport the alcohol could be 
subject to forfeiture. ALASKA STAT. § 4.16.220(a)(3) (2006). 
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IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROSECUTORS 
A. No Fifth Amendment Privilege 
Prosecutors gain several practical advantages by filing charges 
against organizations as opposed to individuals. The first, and perhaps 
most significant, is that an organization does not have a Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. A prosecutor can use 
organizational agents as witnesses to testify about corporate practices or 
records.153 In Amato v. United States,154 the First Circuit, relying largely on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Braswell v. United States,155 explained 
why the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination does 
not protect corporate records.156 
The Alaska Supreme Court subscribed to the collective-entity 
doctrine in Pratt v. Kirkpatrick.157 Citing many of the same cases relied 
upon in Amato, the court held that a records custodian for the financial 
records of a limited partnership could not rely upon the Fifth 
Amendment or Article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution to resist a 
subpoena for the partnership’s financial records.158 Importantly, the 
court found the self-incrimination protections provided by the Alaska 
Constitution were no broader than protections provided by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.159 
Because of these principles, defense attorneys will be hard-pressed 
to successfully preclude the production of an organization’s documents 
sought pursuant to a subpoena or search warrant. Organizations are 
prolific producers of documents, reports, memoranda, and email that 
evidence their decisions and actions. In the event of criminal conduct, 
 
 153. This presumes the agent does not have a personal Fifth Amendment 
right to assert. 
 154. 450 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 155. 487 U.S. 99 (1988). 
 156. 450 F.3d at 49–50 (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a 
personal privilege enjoyed only by individuals). The Fifth Amendment’s 
privilege “‘is designed to prevent the use of legal process to force from the lips 
of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him or to force him 
to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might 
incriminate him.’” Id. (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944)). 
This is true even if the records incriminate the custodian personally. Id. (citing 
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974)). 
 157. 718 P.2d 962, 967–68 (Alaska 1986). 
 158. See id. at 968. 
 159. Id. (“While we are not limited by the federal courts in interpreting our 
own constitution, in this instance we are not persuaded by [the appellant’s] 
arguments to interpret the Alaska self-incrimination provision more broadly 
than the federal courts have construed the fifth amendment.”). 
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any such documents would be invaluable to the prosecution, as they 
may demonstrate the organization’s knowledge or intent. At the very 
least, the documents can confirm the individual agent’s intent or 
knowledge. 
B. Avoiding Hearsay 
Common hearsay problems can also be avoided if an organization 
rather than an individual is charged. Employee or agent statements 
regarding the conduct of the organization will be admissible against the 
organization should the declarant invoke a personal Fifth Amendment 
right not to testify or otherwise make him or herself unavailable for trial. 
The admissions of these agents are not hearsay if offered against the 
organization because the law imputes them to the organization itself; 
under Alaska Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), the admissions are considered 
admissions of the party opponent.160 This subsection excludes as non-
hearsay statements that are made by an agent or servant concerning 
matters within the scope of that individual’s agency or employment and 
made during the existence of the agency or employment relationship. 
This is a broadly interpreted exclusion161 that encompasses a wide range 
of employee statements regarding employer practices, work conditions, 
and decision-making that frequently provide invaluable evidence for the 
prosecution. 
C. Corporations Can Be Tried In Absentia 
Corporations cannot ignore a summons to appear for arraignment. 
Pursuant to Rule 4(a)(3) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
corporations that fail to appear may be tried in absentia.162 The trial of 
an absent corporation would be a slam-dunk for the state. The 
prosecutor could admit evidence to the jury without objection. The 
 
 160. See also United States v. Petraia Mar., Ltd., 489 F. Supp. 2d 90, 94–99 (D. 
Me. 2007) (discussing the analogous provision under the federal rules). 
 161. See Klawock Heenya Corp. v. Dawson Constr., 778 P.2d 219, 220 (Alaska 
1989) (the exclusion covers statements that “merely ‘concern’ the employee’s 
duties” (citations omitted)). 
 162. The rule provides, “[i]f a defendant corporation fails to appear after 
being duly summoned, a plea of not guilty shall be entered by the court if the 
court is empowered to try the offense for which the summons was issued and 
the court may proceed to trial and judgment without further process.” ALASKA 
R. CRIM. PROC. 4(a)(3). The rule does not define “corporation” and the author is 
not aware of any case that interprets this rule. Admittedly, a court could 
interpret “corporation” to be narrower than the term “organization” as it is used 
in section 11.16.130 (2006) of the Alaska Statutes. It is therefore unclear whether 
other types of organizations could be tried in absentia. 
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prosecutor could then ask the jury to convict a business which was 
perfectly happy to injure Alaska or Alaskans in some way but was 
unwilling to show up when invited to an Alaskan courtroom for its own 
trial. Assuming the prosecutor has presented sufficient evidence of the 
charged offenses, it is likely juries will feel little compunction in 
returning guilty verdicts. Upon conviction, the prosecutor could ask the 
judge to issue a judgment against the corporation and that judgment 
could be sent to the Attorney General’s Collection Section for collection. 
D. Organizations Engender Less Sympathy 
The criminal jury instructions commonly employed in Alaska state 
courts invariably include an instruction that directs the jury to disregard 
any sympathy for the defendant during its deliberations.163 
Nevertheless, any prosecutor will tell you that jurors rarely dispatch 
their obligations without sympathizing to some degree with the 
defendant. If an employee engages in improper conduct to primarily 
benefit his or her employer (as opposed to directly benefiting him or 
herself) or if the employee engages in conduct at the behest of his or her 
employer, jurors may be loathe to find the individual guilty of the 
offense. This problem is largely eliminated if the company is tried. 
Regardless of the factual scenario involved, juries are far less prone to 
feel sympathy for an organization.164 Most often, the organization is a 
for-profit company, and juries realize their decision, like the 
organization’s decision to engage in the criminal conduct, is a decision 
about money. Juries seem to struggle far less with the question of 
whether an organization should pay a fine than the question of whether 
an individual should go to jail. 
 
 163. Alaska Pattern Jury Instruction 1.07, “Evaluation of Evidence,” is one 
such example. It instructs jurors “not be influenced by sentiment, prejudice, 
passion or public opinion” in evaluating the evidence. Criminal Pattern Jury 
Instruction Committee, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.07, available at 
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/ins/1.07.doc. 
 164. This is true notwithstanding Alaska Pattern Jury Instruction 1.48, 
“Corporate Defendant,” which instructs juries not to treat a corporate defendant 
any differently than it would an individual defendant. Criminal Pattern Jury 
Instruction Committee, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.48, available at 
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/ins/1.48.doc. 
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V. CHARGING CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Factors to Weigh 
The foregoing discussion is meant to illustrate that organizational 
criminal liability is very broad and has potential application to many 
situations. Nevertheless, these prosecutions can be complex and time 
intensive, and the outcome of any such prosecution is seldom, if ever, 
certain. It follows that a prosecution may not be warranted or be the best 
use of limited resources in every instance. A number of practical 
considerations should inform any decision to prosecute or not prosecute 
an organization. 
Assuming the prosecutor believes he or she can prove all the 
elements of the potential charges, the foremost consideration is the 
prosecution’s objective in pursuing the criminal charges against this 
organization. Key to this concern is the question of punishment. Is the 
goal to punish the organization? Is the goal to achieve restitution? Or is 
the goal to ensure future compliance by this organization or similarly-
situated organizations? Most often the answer is a mixture of all three, 
but that is not always the case. If the organization is one that has few 
assets or no longer exists, the prosecution may yield a conviction and a 
fine or restitution order that cannot be collected. Alternatively, if the 
organization continues to operate and the conduct at issue could 
reoccur, or involves an activity that has not been monitored or heavily 
regulated in the past, a better result may be achieved through less 
adversarial means. Instead of a criminal prosecution, perhaps there is an 
administrative or civil remedy.165 
In answering these questions, the prosecutor should consider the 
following factors.166 The first and foremost consideration is whether the 
prosecution is deserved. Multiple factors will weigh on this 
determination, including whether the injury was caused by egregious or 
intentional conduct or a rogue employee, and the degree to which 
management was complicit in causing the injury.  It will also be 
important to determine whether the conduct was an isolated violation or 
part of a series of violations, and if the organization knew the conduct 
was prohibited. 
 
 165. To be sure, if such options exist, defense counsel will suggest it to the 
prosecution. 
 166. This list is not exhaustive or universally applicable. Depending on the 
circumstances, other factors not listed may be relevant and some listed factors 
may be irrelevant. 
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These factors beg the question: is a prosecution warranted? A 
corollary to this question is the recognition that a criminal prosecution 
carries a significant stigma and is not warranted or necessary in every 
circumstance. With respect to considerations of practicality, the 
following factors should be evaluated and go to the central question of 
what can and will be achieved by prosecuting the organization: 
First, will prosecution deter this organization? Answering this 
question will require analyzing the likelihood of significant penalties 
such as fines or probation.  It will also mean determining if any illegal 
gains will be returned, and if the conduct gave the organization an 
advantage over its competitors.167 
Second, will prosecution deter other similarly-situated 
organizations?  Determining this means researching whether similarly-
situated organizations exist and if the potential penalties would deter 
them.  The penalties may also impact the industry as a whole. 
Third, will prosecution promote future compliance?  Prosecutors 
must consider whether including a compliance program in the penalty 
would address the conduct at issue. 
Fourth, is restitution owed to a broad range of entities or 
individuals?  Considerations will include the necessity of prosecution to 
obtain restitution, the effectiveness of individual claims, and the ability 
of the organization to pay damages. 
Finally, will a prosecution play well in the public’s view?  
Prosecutors should determine whether the public will support legal 
action, an enforcement program more generally, and participate in such 
a program by reporting violations. 
Depending on the answers to these questions, a prosecutor may 
determine that prosecution is not the best alternative. The best practice 
is to make this determination early and not to pursue prosecutions in 
situations not warranting the effort or resources. 
To illustrate these points, consider as an example the potential 
prosecution of a bartender for selling alcohol to an underage patron. 
Faced with an underage “furnishing” crime, police officers will typically 
 
 167. A sentencing court may suspend criminal fines for the period of 
probation. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.080, 12.55.090 (2006). Such “suspended fines” 
are used as a “hammer” to force a defendant to comply with the conditions of 
probation the court imposes. If, during the probation period, the defendant does 
not comply with these conditions, the prosecution can petition the sentencing 
court to revisit the sentence and impose all or a portion of the sentence that was 
suspended. Those determinations are made by the trial judge pursuant to a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. See Wallace v. State, 829 P.2d 1208, 
1210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Andrew v. State, 835 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1992). 
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cite the individual bartender for a Title 4 “furnishing” offense.168 If 
convicted, and if a first-time offender, the bartender will likely receive a 
suspended imposition of sentence, a year’s probation, and a small fine, 
assuming the prosecutor can convince a jury not to nullify the verdict. 
On the other hand, if there is a good reason to charge the bartender’s 
employer—perhaps a large bar or restaurant—with the same Title 4 
violation, that employer will face a much larger potential fine. If the 
employer has committed similar offenses through other employees, each 
of those incidents may be brought to the sentencing judge’s attention 
and would powerfully bolster the prosecutor’s sentencing case. Fines 
could be conditioned on the employer ensuring that its employees 
commit no further violations. The employer could also be affirmatively 
required to notify law enforcement officers of any and all future 
violations.169 In addition, the court may require the employer to provide 
enhanced training for employees at their own expense. Prosecuting the 
employer is a better use of prosecutorial resources. Importantly, the 
prosecution of the employer provides a mechanism to prevent future, 
similar infractions by other employees. The employer will likely be more 
proactive in policing its employees and will be under an affirmative 
duty to report all future violations. Further, it is likely that other similar 
establishments or employers will take notice of the sentence and will 
likewise do a better job of policing their operations and employees. 
These would all be positive outcomes. 
B. Case Study: Strategica Import-Export Financial Group, LLC 
A four-defendant case recently prosecuted by the Office of Special 
Prosecutions, State v. Jeremy Oliver,170 further illustrates why prosecutors 
should consider charging organizations and how they can use those 
prosecutions to achieve better case outcomes. 
The case arose from a failed salmon processing facility in Ekuk, 
Alaska in 2004.171 The failure was an economic disaster for the local 
economy.172 None of the fishermen who had delivered fish to the facility 
 
 168. ALASKA STAT. § 4.16.051 (2006). 
 169. As explained supra Part IV.A, organizations do not have Fifth 
Amendment protection and may be compelled to make statements against their 
interest. 
 170. These defendants were prosecuted as codefendants under case numbers 
3DI-07-016CR, 3DI-07-017CR, 3DI-07-018CR, 3DI-07-019CR, respectively (Alaska 
Dist. Ct. information filed Jan. 5, 2007). 
 171. Information at 7, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI-07-
018CR (Nov. 26, 2007). 
 172. Id. at 18. 
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were paid for their catches and none of the workers who had worked at 
the facility were paid for their labor.173 Jeremy Oliver, a young man with 
limited fishing and processing experience, had formed Wild Alaskan 
Seafood Company, LLC (“Wild Alaskan Seafood Company”) for the 
purpose of the Ekuk processing venture.174 Oliver was able to lease and 
open the Ekuk facility using financing brokered by Jay Enis, a Florida 
merchant banker.175 Enis formed Strategica Import-Export Financial 
Group, LLC (“Strategica”) for the purpose of financing the Ekuk salmon 
processing venture.176 Oliver and Wild Alaskan Seafood Company hired 
dozens of workers to run the facility and accepted more than a million 
pounds of fish from the fishermen.177 The venture failed before the fish 
could be processed, and very little of the fish was ever delivered to a 
purchaser.178 The vast majority of the fish spoiled and ultimately had to 
be destroyed.179 As a result, the fishermen and Ekuk processors were 
never paid.180 
Alaska statutes criminalize the processing of adulterated seafood.181 
The offense is a class A misdemeanor.182 The state prosecuted all four 
defendants—Oliver, Wild Alaska Seafood Company, Enis, and 
Strategica—for this offense, as well as several additional, related 
offenses.183 Ultimately, Oliver, Wild Alaskan Seafood Company and 
Strategica each pled guilty to a charge.184 The court sentenced Oliver to 
serve 180 days in jail (with 140 days suspended) and to pay, along with 
Wild Alaskan Seafood Company, more than $56,000 in restitution to the 
fishermen and workers.185 Because Oliver and Wild Alaskan Seafood 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 4, 7–8. 
 175. Id. at 7–10 . 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 15. 
 178. Id. at 17. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 18. 
 181. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 34.030 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 17.20.305 
(2006). 
 182. See ALASKA STAT. § 17.20.305 (2006). 
 183. Information at 1–2, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI-07-
018CR (Nov. 26, 2007). 
 184. State v. Jeremy Oliver, 3DI-07-015CR (Alaska Dist. Ct. judgment entered 
Nov. 26, 2007); State v. Wild Alaska Seafood, LLC, 3DI-07-016CR (Alaska Dist. 
Ct. judgment entered Nov. 26, 2007); State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, 
3DI-07-017CR (Alaska Dist. Ct. judgment entered Nov. 26, 2007). 
 185. State v. Oliver, 3DI-07-015CR (Alaska Dist. Ct. judgment entered Nov. 
26, 2007); State v. Wild Alaskan Seafood Co., LLC, 3DI-07-016CR (Alaska Dist. 
Ct. judgment entered Nov. 26, 2007). 
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Company have few assets,186 it is unlikely that much of this restitution 
will ever be paid. Oliver and Wild Alaskan Seafood Company were 
prosecuted to punish them for their misdeeds rather than to make the 
injured fishermen and workers whole.187 The court ordered Strategica to 
pay more than $180,000 in restitution.188 The state agreed to dismiss the 
charges against Enis in exchange for Strategica’s plea and payment.189 
The case against Strategica was meant to prosecute that company for its 
misconduct, as well as to provide at least some restitution to the 
fishermen and workers. 
Oliver was clearly the primary culprit of this scheme. Oliver came 
up with the plan to operate the Ekuk facility and was in charge when it 
failed. Nevertheless, once the scheme failed, Oliver and Wild Alaskan 
Seafood Company lacked assets and would never be able to pay much 
in restitution. Enis and Strategica had assets but were not as directly 
involved in the management and operation of the Ekuk facility. Thus, 
the question for the Office of Special Prosecutions was whether it could 
prove Enis and Strategica were criminally liable for the Ekuk failure 
and, if so, whether they warranted criminal prosecution. The answer to 
both questions was “yes.”190 
Strategica’s conduct was egregious. Enis and Strategica had no 
experience in the Alaska seafood industry. Nevertheless, with little due 
diligence and equally little oversight, Strategica provided Wild Alaskan 
 
 186. Information at 8–11, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI-
07-018CR (Nov. 26, 2007). 
 187. Though Oliver had few assets, there was a financial interest that the 
Author suspects prompted Oliver to plea the case on his behalf and on behalf of 
Wild Alaskan Seafood Company. When Oliver formed that company, he 
included his father Michael , a real estate agent in California, as a member. 
Information at 7, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI-07-018CR 
(Nov. 26, 2007). Oliver’s father had assets and was troubled about his potential 
financial exposure for the company’s liabilities. The father signed off on the plea 
agreement for Wild Alaskan Seafood Company on the understanding that he 
would not be a prosecution target and would most likely not have to personally 
satisfy the restitution judgment entered against Wild Alaskan Seafood 
Company. Michael Oliver Aff., State v. Wild Alaska Seafood, LLC, 3DI-07-
016CR. 
 188. State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI-07-018CR (Alaska 
Dist. Ct. judgment entered Nov. 26, 2007). Strategica’s restitution was paid up-
front. The plea agreement required Strategica to pay the total restitution amount 
prior to the company’s change of plea and sentencing.  Id. 
 189. State v. Enis, 3DI-07-019CR (Alaska Dist. Ct. dismissal signed Nov. 23, 
2007). 
 190. Both Enis and Strategica warranted prosecution for the same reasons. 
The discussion herein is limited to Strategica because of the focus of this article 
on organizational criminal liability. 
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Seafood Company with $650,000 in financing for a risky venture191 that 
would operate in a remote locale more than five thousand miles from 
Strategica’s location in Miami.192 Strategica enabled Oliver and Wild 
Alaskan Seafood Company by providing the financial means for them to 
launch the Ekuk facility. Thereafter, Strategica did little to oversee their 
operations or to ensure their success. This conduct was careless, it was 
intentional, and it had a devastating impact on the Ekuk fishery and the 
local economy. 
Practical considerations also supported the decision to prosecute 
Strategica. Most importantly, the State believed prosecution would be 
the most effective way to collect restitution for the fishermen and 
workers. More than a hundred, perhaps more than two hundred, people 
were financially injured due to the Ekuk failure.193 While some of these 
people filed civil actions against the defendants, those suits made little 
progress and, even if successful, stood to benefit a small number of 
individuals. In contrast, a criminal prosecution could recover restitution 
for all those who did not get paid. Of the potential defendants, only Enis 
and Strategica had any real financial resources.194 Therefore, it was 
important that Strategica be prosecuted. 
Additionally, the prosecution of Strategica would play well in the 
realm of public opinion. Strategica was a company that recklessly 
entered the state fishing industry to make a profit for out-of-state 
investors and ended up causing significant financial injuries to many 
Alaskans. In addition to the direct financial losses inflicted on the Ekuk 
fishermen and workers, Strategica’s actions could have inflicted 
significant harm to the reputation of Alaskan salmon. The Alaska 
seafood industry relies on the high reputation of “wild Alaskan salmon” 
to market its product and has spent years and millions of public 
relations dollars to build up that reputation.195 If some of the damaged 
Ekuk salmon had actually made it into the marketplace and sickened 
unsuspecting consumers, the reputation and marketability of Alaskan 
salmon would have been dealt a significant blow. Considering the 
 
 191. Salmon processing is by its very nature a risky undertaking. Catches, and 
the market, vary from year to year and can always be impacted by factors—fish 
counts, weather events, economic uncertainties—that are beyond anyone’s 
control. 
 192. Information at 6–8, 11, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 
3DI-07-018CR (Nov. 26, 2007). 
 193. Id. at 18. 
 194. Id. at 8. 
 195. See, e.g., Press Release, Sarah Palin, Governor, State of Alaska, Palin Asks 
for Changes to Fish Farm Proposal (Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://gov 
.state.ak.us/archive-51004.html. 
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reckless manner in which Strategica acted to enable and finance Oliver 
and Wild Alaskan Seafood Company, the State believed the Alaskans 
would overwhelmingly support Strategica’s prosecution and the 
Department of Environmental Conservation’s continued efforts to 
regulate seafood processing facilities. 
Finally, the State believed prosecuting Strategica would serve as a 
deterrent to future reckless investment in the Alaska seafood industry 
by outside entities. The prosecution resulted in significant financial 
penalties—the restitution payment—and would receive significant 
publicity. This result would certainly deter Strategica from future 
similar conduct and, it is hoped, would deter other similarly situated 
entities from doing anything similar. 
CONCLUSION 
The ability to file criminal charges against an organization in 
addition to, or in lieu of, charges against individual agents is a powerful 
tool available to prosecutors. The prosecution of organizations must be 
considered, whenever feasible, to deter future wrongdoing. 
Furthermore, it is far more efficient to prosecute the organization that 
controls a large number of agents engaging in prohibited conduct rather 
than prosecuting each agent individually. 
Prosecuting the organization makes sense for a variety of 
additional reasons. First, significant criminal fines can be imposed 
against organizations. Second, organizations—rational entities with a 
bottom line and a strong preference against negative publicity—tend to 
be prosecution averse. This fact is good news for the prosecution 
because it means a trial can be avoided and constructive changes can be 
implemented as part of any resolution.196 Third, organizations enjoy 
fewer constitutional protections than do individual defendants and, as 
such, can make use of fewer evidentiary rules to limit the prosecution’s 
evidence. Lastly, the prosecution of an organization as well as 
individual defendants could strengthen the prosecution’s hand during 
plea negotiations. The organization may be persuaded to accept a plea in 
 
 196. For example, in pollution cases, resolutions often require defendant 
companies to implement environmental compliance management systems—
detailed plans that dictate the specific procedures and safety measures the 
company is required to implement for a period of time. These compliance 
agreements are typically more stringent than any planning or contingency plan 
requirements imposed by statute or regulation. In other words, to resolve the 
criminal charges, organizations will agree to be far more proactive in guarding 
against future infractions. Such agreements are not only helpful, but also 
provide good publicity for both the organization and the prosecution. 
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return for dismissal against certain individual officers, or vice-versa. By 
charging both, the prosecution increases its options for a successful and 
beneficial resolution. 
Several potential explanations for why Alaska prosecutors rarely 
charge organizations for the criminal conduct of their agents are 
proffered in the introduction. None satisfactorily explain this 
phenomenon. Yes, such prosecutions will likely differ in some respects 
from the prosecution of individual defendants. Yes, organizational 
defendants may hire experienced defense counsel. And yes, such 
prosecutions might, in some cases, penalize stockholders who did not 
know about the wrongdoing. But these drawbacks, to the extent they are 
legitimate at all, are insignificant compared to the potential benefits that 
such prosecutions can realize. Quite simply, prosecutors should file 
charges against organizations more frequently. Such change may not 
happen quickly; nonetheless, it is time to adjust course and to start 
looking more closely at organizational targets. Successful criminal 
prosecutions of organizations can be a significant deterrent that causes 
organizations to take significant steps to better monitor the behavior of 
their agents and to prevent criminal conduct in the course of their 
operations. 
 
